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ABSTRACT 
 
The United Nations employs roughly 44,000 of people from 
every corner of the globe.  In hiring, the Secretary-General, the chief 
administrative officer, seeks to secure the “highest standards of effi-
ciency, competence, and integrity” in its staff, and to recruit on “as 
wide a geographical basis as possible.”1 To effectively execute the 
many missions of the organization, these employees are required to 
affirm loyalty to the U.N. and assert their independence from their 
country of origin.  This independence from national influence is seen 
                                                   
*  J.D., 2017, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Director, International 
Human Rights Advocates. Senior Editor, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law 
and Social Change. I would like to thank Professor Jean Galbraith for her guidance 
on this article and her insight and support throughout my time in law school. I 
would also like to thank the talented team at the University of Pennsylvania Journal 
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my piece.  
1  U.N. Charter art. 97 (“The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary General and 
such staff as the Organization may require.  The Secretary-General shall be ap-
pointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Coun-
cil.  He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.”); U.N. Charter 
art. 101, ¶. 3. (“The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in 
the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the 
highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity.  Due regard shall be paid 
to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possi-
ble.”). 
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as imperative for the operations of the U.N. Secretariat; as its objec-
tives can sometimes contradict the expressed will of certain Mem-
ber-States.  This level of removal from the Member-States requires 
that the United Nations and its employees receive certain privileges 
and immunities.  One of these immunities is a jurisdictional bar to 
prosecution arising from acts taken in their official capacity.  The 
Secretary-General acts as the gatekeeper for accused employees.  He 
determines if, when, and how immunity will be waived.  His office 
ultimately determines what avenue of accountability is appropriate 
and which courts should have jurisdiction in the situation.  Due to 
privacy and due process concerns, these decisions are seldom made 
transparently, and the Secretary-General’s decision is largely left un-
checked.  This paper will discuss the need for an independent inter-
national civil service and acknowledge the need for certain privi-
leges and immunities.  It will then outline the current legal 
framework for individual accountability in the United Nations and 
explain the role of the Secretary-General in this process.  Under-
standing the basic infrastructure, it will then highlight some of the 
inconsistencies in practice and consider the merits and flaws with 
some of the current and proposed accountability avenues.  The au-
thor will then offer two recommendations for a more consistent and 
transparent system. 
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1.  INDEPENDENCE 
 
The origins of the international bureaucracy trace back to the 
League of Nations, which required its officials to act only for the or-
ganization.2  The founders modeled the new system on the Ameri-
can and British government administrations, which require their na-
tional civil servants to refrain from overt displays of, and 
participation in, national or party politics.  At the national level, bu-
reaucrats are tasked with separating their role in the national gov-
ernment from their personal political and policy preferences.  At the 
international level a civil servant’s independence necessitates a pri-
oritization of the international organization over an allegiance to the 
individual’s home country.3 
The U.N. Staff Regulations reaffirm the message found in those 
of the League of Nations, stating: “Staff members are international 
civil servants.  Their responsibilities as staff members are not na-
tional but exclusively international.”4  International civil servants 
are required to declare that they will “regulate [their] conduct with 
the interests of the United Nations only in view.”5 
From its inception, scholars acknowledged that true independ-
ence could create “a potential rivalry between the ties of an official 
with his institution and the ties of an official with his State.”6  To 
preempt this conflict of interest, the International Civil Service Com-
mission Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service 
states: “[I]nternational civil servants must remain independent of 
any authority outside their organization. . . they should not seek nor 
                                                   
2  Dag Hammarskjöld, The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact, 26 Issue 
3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 747, 750 (2015) (“The international civil service has its genesis in 
the League of Nations. . ..”).  
3  Padma G. Shahani, The International Civil Servants, 27.2 THE INDIAN J. OF POL. 
SCI., 12, 12-25 (Apr.-June, 1966) (“The Secretariat being an international organiza-
tion, its members owe their loyalty to that organization and not to their own states 
to which they belong.”).  
4  U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s bulletin: Staff Rules and Staff Reg-
ulations of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2014/1 Regulation 1.1 (a) (Jan. 1, 
2014). 
5  U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s bulletin: Staff Rules and Staff Reg-
ulations of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2014/1 Regulation 1.1 (b) (Jan. 1, 
2014). 
6  L.C. Green, The International Civil Servant, His Employer and His State, 40 
Transactions of the Grotius Society 147, 147-148 (1954) (“Inherent in this idea of a 
totally independent service is a potential rivalry between the ties of an official with 
his institution and the ties of an official with his.”).  
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should they accept instructions from any Government, person or en-
tity external to the organization. . . International civil servants 
should be constantly aware that, through their allegiance to the 
Charter and the corresponding instruments of each organization, 
member States and their representatives are committed to respect 
their independent status.”7  True independence means freedom 
from the influence of all governments, not just that of the individ-
ual’s nation of origin. 
 
2.  FRAMEWORK FOR IMMUNITY 
 
To remain outside of the influence of States and preserve the in-
dependence of the civil service, privileges and immunities are ex-
tended to both the international organization as a whole and the in-
dividuals who comprise it.  These privileges and immunities are 
enshrined in Article 105 of the United Nations Charter, which says, 
“Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials 
of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and im-
munities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their func-
tions in connection with the Organization.”8  As diplomatic and 
functional immunity for international organization employees is not 
found in customary international law, only those States that consent 
through treaty or agreement are obligated to honor the dispensa-
tions given to international civil servants.9  The Security-General has 
the power to determine which groups of U.N. employees qualify for 
functional immunity, and has bestowed this privilege to “all mem-
bers of the staff of the United Nations with the exception of those 
who are recruited locally and who are assigned to hourly rates.”10 
These privileges and immunities include mechanisms to protect 
                                                   
7  U.N. International Civil Service Commission, Standards of Conduct for the In-
ternational Civil Service, ¶8 (July, 2013), http://icsc.un.org/resources/pdfs/gen-
eral/standardsE.pdf.  
8  U.N. Charter, art. 105.  
9  BENEDETTO CONFORTI AND CARLO FOCARELLI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS 137 (5th ed. 2016) (“Since, as we have seen, no immunity is granted 
by customary international law, a non-Member State of the United Nations which 
is not bound by special treaty provisions, has no obligation to concede immunities 
or privileges to Secretariat officials.”). 
10  U.N. Secretary-General, Categories of Officials to which the Provisions of Article 
V and Article VII Shall Apply, 1 U.N. Doc. A/16 (Oct. 16, 1946). 
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them from legal actions taken by the States.11  Removing the organ-
ization and its employees from the sphere of the application of do-
mestic law prevents them from being subject to the control of Mem-
ber-States.12  The United Nations employs staff from many different 
nationalities and assigns them to posts around the globe.  This 
widely diverse geographic spread makes it likely that the civil serv-
ants will encounter a wide variety of domestic law.  Granting them 
functional immunity from the purview of local courts and instead 
instituting internal policies may be seen as more uniform, consistent, 
and fair for the individual employees.13  Immunity must be affirma-
tively asserted; if not, the individual submits himself or herself to 
the jurisdiction of the court.14 
However, immunity is nuanced; it is not a carte blanche to all 
civil servants for all illegal activities. International bureaucrats do 
not have full diplomatic immunity because the architects of the sys-
tem viewed their role as being very different from that of a diplo-
mat.15  The Convention on Privileges and Immunities states: “Offi-
cials of the United Nations shall be immune from legal process in 
respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them 
in their official capacity.”16  It goes on to clarify, “Privileges and im-
munities are granted to officials in the interests of the United Na-
tions and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves.  
The Secretary-General shall have the right and the duty to waive the 
                                                   
11  David R. Ruzie, The Independence of International Civil Servants from Govern-
ments, AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 168, 169 (1998) (“The privileges and immunities should be 
used to assure the independence of the personnel by protecting them against legal 
actions or other measures that may be taken by member states of the organization 
against them.”). 
12  CHITTHARANJAN AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 272 (2nd ed. 2005) (“If the national law of the mem-
ber states applied to relations between the organization and its staff, the courts of 
states would probably be competent to hear disputes. . .a situation which would 
have had drawbacks for the organization. It would them find itself subject to the 
control of members.”).  
13  Id. at 277. 
14  Id. at 349.  
15  Anthony J. Miller, Privileges and Immunities of United Nations Officials, 4 INT’L 
ORG. L. REV. 169, 178 (2007) (“It was therefore realized early on that the utilization 
of the full range of diplomatic immunity was problematic when applied automati-
cally to the situation of an international civil servant whose role and functional 
needs were very different from that of a diplomat representing a particular State, 
under the control of which the diplomat remained.”).  
16  U.N. Convention on Privileges and Immunities, art. V section 18(a), adopted 
Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1970). 
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immunity of any official in any case where, in his opinion, the im-
munity would impede the course of justice and can be waived with-
out prejudice to the interests of the United Nations.”17  It further 
pledges that “The United Nations shall co-operate at all times with 
the appropriate authorities of Members to facilitate the proper ad-
ministration of justice, secure the observance of police regulations 
and prevent the occurrence of any abuse in connection with the priv-
ileges, immunities, and facilities mentioned in this Article.”18 
Ultimately the Secretary-General has the power to determine if 
the individual was performing in his or her official capacity, and if 
so, whether or not immunity should be waived.  Immunity covers 
the individual’s functions “in connection with the Organization,”19 
which includes more than just the official act itself; it includes all 
activities that are reasonably related to the official functions.20 Some 
national courts disagree that the Secretary-General alone can make 
this determination, and they have held that domestic authorities 
may also determine if the accused official was acting within his or 
her sphere of employment.21  Immunity is not applicable to situa-
tions where the civil servant is acting in a private capacity.  If the 
Secretary-General determines that the act in question was a private 
one, he will inform the investigators, claimant, or court that initially 
inquired about the immunity, that none exists.22  In theory, most 
criminal activities will not have a sufficient nexus to the individual’s 
role with the U.N., and no protections may be given, nor permission 
sought, from the organization for prosecution. 
Immunity is granted for the benefit of the United Nations, not 
the individual.23  Since the immunity is meant to protect the organi-
                                                   
17  Id. at section 20.  
18  Id. at section 21.  
 19   U.N. Charter art. 105, ¶ 1. 
       20   Miller, supra note 15 at 193. 
21  Id. at 197; citing Westchester County on Complaint of Donnelly v. Ranollo, 13 
I.L.R. 168, 67 N.Y.S.2d. 31 (City Ct. New Rochelle 1946) (a United Nations driver 
went above the speed limit while chauffeuring the Secretary-General.  The police 
wrote him a speeding ticket and the Court refused to grant him official immunity 
without a determination by the United States State Department that he was acting 
in an official capacity); See also People v. Coumatos, 32 Misc. 2d 1085 (General Sessions 
Court, 1962).  The Court determined that an inventory clerk at the United Nations 
was not immune from the grand larceny charges even though the crimes took place 
at the U.N. headquarters.  
22  Miller, supra note 15 at 245.  
23  Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, section 20, 
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zation and not to shield individuals from justice, the Secretary-Gen-
eral does not need to consult with the accused individual about 
waiving his or her immunity.24  He is able to make that decision uni-
laterally.  The Convention on Privileges and Immunities imposes a 
duty on the Secretary-General to waive immunity when immunity 
“would impede the course of justice and can be waived without 
prejudice to the interests of the United Nations.”25  This strong lan-
guage should be understood to limit both the discretion of the Sec-
retary-General and the safe haven of functional immunity.  If im-
munity does apply, and the Secretary-General finds that it cannot, 
or should not, be waived, the United Nations is still bound to create 
an alternative mechanism for accountability and reparations.26 
To assist the Secretary-General in making these important deter-
minations, the General Assembly created the Office of Internal 
Oversight Services (OIOS) in 1994.27  The Secretary-General nomi-
nates, and the General Assembly approves the appointment of, the 
head of OIOS, who is the Under-Secretary-General.28  OIOS is com-
prised of the Internal Audit Division, the Inspections and Evaluation 
Division, and the Investigations Division.  Each of these divisions 
has a Director, who reports to the Under-Secretary-General’s of-
fice.29  The Under-Secretary-General operates independently from 
the Secretary-General, but is held accountable by his office.30  OIOS 
states that its mandate is to “[promote] responsible administration 
of resources, a culture of accountability and transparency, and im-
proved programme performance.”31  The Investigations Division is 
responsible for investigating U.N. employees who are accused of 
                                                   
(Feb. 13, 1946). 
24  Miller, supra note 15 at 238. 
25  Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra note 
23. 
26  Id. at section 29(b). 
27  G.A. Res. 48/218 B, P 5 (Dec. 23,1993), U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/218 (Aug. 12, 
1994) (This concerns oversight of UN employees in managerial positions).  
28  “About OIOS”, OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES (Nov. 29, 2016), 
https://oios.un.org/page?slug=about-oios [https://perma.cc/X539-59ZR]. 
29   Tamara A. Shockley, The Investigation Procedures of the United Nations Office 
of Internal Oversight Services and the Rights of the United Nations Staff Member: An 
Analysis of the United Nations Judicial Tribunal on Disciplinary Cases in the United Na-
tions, 27 PACE INT’L L. REV. 469, 475 (2015). 
30  Id. at 475.  
31  OIOS Mission and Mandate, OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES (Nov. 
29, 2016), https://oios.un.org/page?slug=mandate [https://perma.cc/2YXM-
7N99]. 
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breaching their duties or committing a crime.  This division employs 
independently and professionally trained investigators to handle 
matters relating to “serious fraud, cases involving loss of life to staff 
or others, sexual abuse, and substantial violations of U.N. regula-
tions”, among other criminal activities.32 
OIOS’s power to initiate an investigation has been delegated to 
the office from the Secretary-General.33  Referral to OIOS is not man-
datory, and the agency has discretion to choose the matters it inves-
tigates.34  If the agency chooses to accept a matter for investigation, 
it reports its findings and recommendations to the Under-Secretary-
General.35  If the investigation uncovered evidence of criminal activ-
ity, OIOS can notify the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs and recommend 
a referral to domestic law enforcement.36  OIOS is not responsible 
for the discipline of a U.N. employee.  Its report and recommenda-
tions may be instrumental in the decision, but all disciplinary deci-
sions are made by the Secretary-General.37  The standard for the bur-
den of proof for an internal U.N. investigation leading to 
disciplinary action is less stringent than that of a criminal proceed-
ing: only “clear and convincing evidence,”  rather than “beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”38  For internal disciplinary measures, termina-
tion of employment is the strongest sanction the Secretary-General 
can impose.  His office cannot imprison or infringe on the liberties 
of an individual; that power remains with the Member-States. 
 
3.  CURRENT PRACTICE 
 
The Secretary-General and his sub-agents exercise a great deal 
of discretion over the investigatory, reporting, and disciplinary 
phases after an allegation has been made.  If there is sufficient and 
                                                   
32  Shockley, supra note 29 at 479. (cases that would be referred to OIOS. No 
direct quote as within sentence)  
33  Id. at 486–487 (decision to take action against staff is at discretion of Secre-
tary-General). 
34  Id. at 482 (discretionary powers of Secretary-General).  
35  Id. (the kind of action/responsibility taken on by Under-Secretary-General). 
36  Id. (the case of criminality and its effects).  
37  U.N. Secretary-General, Staff Rules and Staff Regulations of the United Na-
tions: Rep. of Secretary-General, Art. X, Reg. 10.1(a), U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2011/1 
(Jan. 1, 2011). 
38  Shockley, supra note 29 at 544–545. (the standard of proof in disciplinary 
cases)  
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compelling evidence of a criminal act, the Secretary-General also re-
tains the discretion to consult, inform, or liaise with a Member-State 
on the case.  If the local authorities of the host State are aware of the 
misconduct, initiate an investigation, and petition for the waiver of 
immunity, the Secretary-General should waive immunity, if it 
would not injure the organization, and cooperate with the local au-
thorities in the interest of justice.  The Secretary-General also has the 
option of taking the OIOS report, recommendations, and evidence 
to the home State of the perpetrator and officially referring the case. 
To comply with General Assembly Resolution 59/287, which re-
quired the Secretary-General to inform the organization of common 
forms of misconduct and their punitive consequences, the Secretary-
General publishes an annual circular describing the disciplinary ac-
tions taken in that year.39  In the circular, the Secretary-General out-
lines the “administrative machinery with respect to disciplinary 
matters,” including his role and the protections in place for due pro-
cess and procedural fairness.40  To protect the privacy concerns of 
the individuals involved, neither their names nor their nationalities 
are listed, and their job titles will only be disclosed if it is necessary 
for a clear description of the misconduct.41  Each circulation lists all 
of the possible disciplinary actions available to the U.N. as an em-
ployer, the most severe being summary dismissal. 
When there is strong evidence that an employee has committed 
a crime in the course of his or her duties, a broad summary of the act 
is included in the circular which states that the employee was dis-
missed.  However, the summary does not usually include whether 
the case has been referred to a State for prosecution.  For example, 
in the circular for the period of July 1, 2014–June 30, 2015, two seri-
                                                   
39  G.A. Res. 59/287, ¶ 16 (Apr. 21, 2005) (“Re-emphasizes also that the Office 
of Internal Oversight Services is the internal body entrusted with investigation in 
the United Nations.”).  
40  U.N. Doc. ST/IC/2015/22 (Sept. 22, 2015) (“Staff regulation 10.1 (a) pro-
vides that ‘the Secretary-General may impose disciplinary measures on staff mem-
bers who engage in misconduct’.”).  See also U.N. Doc. ST/IC/2004/28 (July 26, 
2004) (“Where the head of office or other responsible officer believes, following an 
investigation, that misconduct may have occurred, he or she refers the matter to the 
Assistant Secretary General for Human Resources Management for a decision on 
whether to pursue the matter as a disciplinary case.”); U.N. Doc. ST/IC/2002/25 
(Apr. 29, 2002) (“The purpose of the present circular is to inform staff members of 
the practice of the Secretary-General in exercising his authority in disciplinary mat-
ters under article X of the United Nations Staff Regulations.”). 
41  Id.  
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ous crimes are noted, but buried with all of the other, more perfunc-
tory, infractions: 
“A staff member used an official vehicle of the Organization 
to transport approximately 173 kilograms of marijuana.  Dis-
position: dismissal.”42 
“A staff member stored pornographic material, including 
pornography involving a minor, on the staff member’s 
United Nations computer, distributed other pornographic 
material through the Organization’s e-mail system and 
failed to report that another staff member had sent the staff 
member inappropriate material through the Organization’s 
e-mail system.  Disposition: dismissal”43 
Transportation of 173 kilograms (381 pounds) of illicit sub-
stances and distribution of child pornography are felonies in the 
United States that carry substantial jail time and are similarly penal-
ized in many countries around the world.44  While the U.N. internal 
investigation process is not equivalent to a criminal investigation, 
and a finding of culpability sufficient to result in dismissal does not 
require the same standard as a criminal conviction, the report makes 
no mention of a referral to a competent agency or government.  The 
report does not name the country in which the alleged crime took 
place, nor does it identify the country of origin of the accused indi-
vidual.  From the outside looking in, there is no clear way to learn 
what, if any, accountability measures or criminal investigations 
were implemented.  From 2004–2016 the annual circulars reported 
at least ten dismissals for child pornography, twenty-two for sexual 
assaults, including the rape of minors, and at least thirty-five for 
physical assault.45  Additionally, the circulars noted approximately 
                                                   
42  U.N. Doc. ST/IC/2015/22, ¶ 37 (Sept. 22, 2015). 
43  Id. at ¶ 46. 
44  Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Trafficking Penalties (2016); 
U.S. Department of Justice, Citizen’s Guide to U.S. Federal Law on Child Pornog-
raphy (2016); Open Government License, Drug Penalties (2016); The Crown Prose-
cution Service, Prohibited Images of Children (2016); European Monitoring Centre 
for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Penalties for drug law offences in Europe at a 
glance, (2016) (Illustrating restricted behaviors and penalties in regard to drugs and 
child pornography). 
45  See U.N. Doc. ST/IC/2005/51 (Aug. 30, 2005); U.N. Doc. ST/IC/2006/48 
(July 31, 2006); U.N. Doc. ST/IC/2007/47 (Aug. 31, 2017); U.N. Doc. 
ST/IC/2008/41 (Aug. 15, 2008); U.N. Doc. ST/IC/2009/30 (Aug. 19, 2009); U.N. 
Doc. ST/IC/2010/26 (Sept. 7, 2010); U.N. Doc. ST/IC/2011/20 (July 27, 2011); U.N. 
Doc. ST/IC/2012/19 (Sept. 6, 2012); U.N. Doc. ST/IC/2013/29 (Sept. 18, 2013); 
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101 case referrals to national governments but did not offer suffi-
cient details on the cases referred or the recipient State.46 
As these annual circulars are publicly available, the press some-
times acts as an investigatory watchdog.  After the Under-Secretary 
General published the 2015 circular, multiple press agencies re-
ported on the content and contacted the U.N. for further clarification 
on the subsequent criminal investigations of the allegations of drug 
trafficking and distribution of child pornography.47  When asked to 
comment, the U.N. spokesman Farhan Haq disclosed that the five 
individuals had been dismissed and repatriated with the intention 
that their host countries would investigate and prosecute.  When 
asked further about accountability, he said, “While the United Na-
tions can and does follow up with Member States, the national au-
thorities concerned have the sole prerogative in determining what, 
if any, investigations or proceedings are initiated against the indi-
viduals.”48  He also admitted that after the referral is made, it is up 
to the State to communicate any updates to the United Nations.49 
Unfortunately, these stories are not unique; there have been a 
total of eight employees who have been listed as dismissed for sim-
ilar offenses relating to child pornography since 2007, and there 
have been no reports detailing any criminal investigations initiated 
by any of the States.50  The Under-Secretary report from July 1, 2007–
June 30, 2008 detailed an account of an employee who downloaded 
child pornography to his work-issued computer and “persisted in 
such conduct even after being formally warned for misusing U.N. 
                                                   
U.N. Doc. ST/IC/2014/26 (Oct. 15, 2014); U.N. Doc. ST/IC/2015/22 (Sept. 22, 2015) 
(Illustrating cases of staff member sexual misconduct).   
46  Id.  
47  Child Porn and Drugs Sees Five UN Staff Fired, BBC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-34683472 [https://perma.cc/ZJ3U-C9XE]; Joe 
Sandler Clarke, UN Staff Circulated Child Abuse Images on Work Emails, THE 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-
professionals-network/2015/oct/29/un-staff-circulated-child-abuse-images-on-
work-emails [https://perma.cc/MTT4-WBK5]; Reuters Staff, U.N. Staff Fired Over 
Child Porn, Moving Drugs in U.N. Vehicle, REUTERS (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-un-crime-idUSKCN0SO24J20151030 
[https://perma.cc/26DK-D4AB] (Illustrating cases that were reported by the 
press).  
48  Reuters Staff, supra note 47.  
49  Id.  
50  Clarke, supra note 47. 
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property.”51  There is no indication in the report as to why this indi-
vidual received a warning about his pornographic viewing behavior 
before his ultimate termination and the others did not.  Similarly, 
there is no indication as to whether the home State of this individual 
initiated an investigation or brought charges. 
Watching and distributing child pornography through U.N. 
channels is egregious enough conduct to warrant outrage and cries 
for accountability from the outside world, but these are not the only 
crimes of a sexual nature outlined in the report.  Credible allegations 
of sexual assault have plagued the United Nations for years and 
“sexual exploitation and sexual abuse” is a category of offenses in 
the Under-Secretary General’s annual circular.52  While these circu-
lars cover a broad number of the U.N. staff, they do not disclose mis-
conduct of those who participate in U.N. peacekeeping missions.53 
 
3.1.  Peacekeeping Missions 
 
In recent years, U.N. peacekeeping missions have been at the 
center of the conversation about employee sexual misconduct.  
Peacekeeping missions bring together a variety of people who enjoy 
different privileges and immunities based on their roles.  All U.N. 
personnel working at the mission are colloquially termed “peace-
keepers,” however there is a substantial distinction between the mil-
itary components, the police, the locally recruited staff, and the in-
ternational civil servants. 
The military forces that operate as part of the peacekeeping mis-
sion do so under the direct supervision and authority of their home 
governments, known as troop-contributing countries.  Their man-
date comes from the U.N., but they operate under their traditional 
chain of command and do not purport to operate independently.  
Generally the troop contributing countries enter into a Memoranda 
                                                   
51  U.N. Doc. ST/IC/2008/41 (Aug. 15, 2008).  
52  Id.  
53  Non-civilian peacekeepers are not the only group of U.N. temporary em-
ployees whose accountability is highly contested.  Special Rapporteurs for the Hu-
man Rights Council are temporary experts who are expected to work inde-
pendently from any national government.  This Article is not able to fully analyze 
the debate surrounding their accountability mechanisms, as they are not interna-
tional civil servants.  For a robust account of this complex debate, see Philip Alston, 
Hobbling the Monitors: Should U.N. Human Rights Monitors be Accountable?, 52 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 561 (2011).  
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of Understanding with the United Nations that stipulates that only 
they, the home countries, retain the ability to investigate and prose-
cute members of their military forces for crimes committed while on 
mission.54  Here, unlike for other U.N. employees, there is a clear 
mandate for State responsibility for prosecution, removing mem-
bers of the military peacekeepers from the reach of the Convention 
on Privileges and Immunities and placing them under the authority 
granted in the Memoranda of Understanding.55  The Secretary-Gen-
eral is not responsible for investigating and waiving immunity for 
military personnel; he is confined to merely repatriating the accused 
offender.  There are no mandatory obligations for the State to then 
report back to the United Nations about subsequent action taken on 
the case. 
Non-military employees on the mission operate in a different 
structure.  When the U.N. establishes a peacekeeping mission, usu-
ally pursuant to a Security Council resolution, it enters into a Status 
of Forces Agreement with the nation that will host the mission.  This 
agreement accords functional immunity to all mission employees, 
even those who are locally recruited and paid hourly and are nor-
mally excluded from the protection of the Convention on Privileges 
and Immunities.56  Functional immunity is equivalent to the immun-
ity extended to international civil servants working outside of the 
peacekeeping space.57  The Secretary-General and his specialized of-
fices have the authority to investigate and determine whether or not 
immunity applies or should be waived.  The nature of the immuni-
ties is often explicitly conveyed in the Status of Forces Agreement.  
The Status of Forces Agreement that established the U.N. peace-
keeping mission in South Sudan reiterates that military forces may 
not be criminally investigated or brought to trial anywhere other 
than their home country.58  It also specifies that the government of 
                                                   
54  Fact Sheet: Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, CODE BLUE (May 
13, 2015), http://www.codebluecampaign.com/fact-sheets-materi-
als/2015/5/13/immunity  [https://perma.cc/PBX3-9PG3]. 
55  Id.  
56  Id.; Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability 
in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT’L L. 103, 108-109 (2002); Paul C. Szasz 
and Thordis Ingadottir, The UN and the ICC: The Immunity of the UN and Its Officials, 
14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 867, 872 (2001).  
57  Rawski, supra note 56, at 110–111.  
58  The Status of Forces Agreement Between the United Nations and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of South Sudan Concerning the United Nations Mission in 
South Sudan (“SOFA”), ¶ 51, (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.un.org/en/peacekeep-
ing/missions/unmiss/documents/unmiss_sofa_08082011.pdf 
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South Sudan could criminally prosecute a non-military employee at 
the mission if the Special Representative, a U.N. employee, author-
izes the action.59  This agreement clearly allows for local prosecution 
of U.N. employees once immunity has been waived, but it stipulates 
that the South Sudanese must conduct the legal process “in accord-
ance with international standards of justice, fairness and due pro-
cess of law, as set out in the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights, to which South Sudan intends to become a Party”.60  
Of course, the Secretary-General via the Special Representative can 
decline to waive immunity, denying local jurisdiction, and can 
choose to repatriate the bad actor instead.  If the individual is repat-
riated with his immunity intact, he will not face a criminal investi-
gation or prosecution in his home country. 
 
4.  POTENTIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK 
 
There is a substantial debate as to whether prosecution by the 
home country or the host country is better.  The General Assembly 
has attempted to tackle this complex issue in the context of the 
peacekeeping missions through special committees and a “Group of 
Legal Experts”.  The experts and the Member-States published mul-
tiple reports and passed several resolutions condemning sexual 
abuse and exploitation and recommending that culpable individu-
als be held accountable.61  In 2008, the Sixth Committee of the Gen-
eral Assembly met to discuss the legal aspects of accountability for 
missions.62  Subsequently, the General Assembly passed resolutions 
encouraging States to extended their criminal jurisdiction for crimes 
committed by their nationals abroad on a U.N. mission and to coop-
erate with other Member-States and the U.N. to share information 
and pursue perpetrators.63 
                                                   
[https://perma.cc/5UNY-WMZH]. 
59  Id.  
60  Id. at ¶ 51.  
61  See generally Rep. of the Group of Legal Experts on ensuring the accounta-
bility of United Nations staff and experts on mission with respect to criminal acts 
committed in peacekeeping operations, U.N. Doc. A/60/980 (Aug. 16, 2006); G.A. 
Res. 64/110 (Jan. 15, 2010). 
62  Marco Odello, Tackling Criminal Acts in Peacekeeping Operations: The Ac-
countability of Peacekeepers, 15 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 347, 354 (2010).  
63  Odello, supra note 62; G.A. Res. 62/63 (Jan. 8, 2008); G.A. Res. 63/119 (Jan. 
15, 2009). 
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The Sixth Committee of the General Assembly convened again 
to discuss this subject in 2014.  The States reiterated the importance 
of prosecuting wrongdoers to protect the image and the mandate of 
the organization and acknowledged large gaps in accountability.64  
South Africa recognized that some countries preferred that the host 
countries prosecute locally, but, speaking for the Africa Group, dis-
agreed and advocated for the perpetrator to return to the home 
country for prosecution.65  Thailand suggested that these matters 
should be explicitly delegated through treaties and agreements on 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters between host States and 
troop-contributing States.66 Norway and Finland highlighted that 
the U.N. rarely, if ever, receives feedback or subsequent information 
about criminal action on cases it refers back to the home country of 
the perpetrator.67  Agreeing, the United States suggested a more for-
mal feedback system to receive and record information about refer-
rals.68  Several states mentioned the potential for a future convention 
defining State responsibility in this context.69  This dialogue identi-
fied the States’ disagreements over the best direction for criminal li-
ability, especially for sexual crimes committed at U.N. missions, and 
substantial institutional gaps and failings existing in the current sys-
tem. 
While individual accountability is generally discussed in the 
context of sexual crimes in U.N. missions, these conversations can, 
and should, be extended to a broader system of criminal accounta-
bility for all U.N. employees.  The current system is ad hoc, lacks 
transparency, and is fraught with gaps that allow many employees 
to escape proper investigation and prosecution.  For employees who 
enjoy functional immunity and who are not covered by an interna-
tional agreement between the U.N. and a Member-State that dictates 
criminal jurisdiction, the Secretary-General has the power to decide 
                                                   
64  Meetings Coverage, Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials, 
Experts on Mission Critical to Organization’s Credibility, Legal Committee Stresses 
in Debate, GA/L/3485 (Oct. 22, 2014), 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gal3485.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/CA3F-
8PA8]. 
65  Id.  
66  Id.  
67  Id.  Finland cited that out of sixty-two referrals, the Office of Legal Affairs 
had only received subsequent information about five cases.  
68  Id.  
69  Id.  
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to waive immunity, to order the employee to repatriate, or to coop-
erate and contribute to the investigation and prosecution of a local 
government.  Many of these determinations are made on a case-by-
case basis without much transparency.  The next section of this Ar-
ticle will explore some of the potential avenues for criminal account-
ability that could be utilized in the context of international civil serv-
ant misconduct, specifically home State prosecution, host State 
prosecution, an independent U.N. tribunal, or the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). 
 
4.1.  Prosecution in the Home Country of the Accused Individual 
 
Even though international civil servants pledge independence 
from their countries of origin when they take their place as employ-
ees of the United Nations, their countries of origin have an interest 
in the due process and fair treatment of their citizens.  Many of the 
most egregious crimes occur in developing or conflict-prone nations 
that have a fledgling or fragile judicial system.  They may not be able 
to investigate and prosecute the individual in a way that comports 
with international standards of justice.70  While a dysfunctional jus-
tice system may cause problems with local prosecution, it can also 
complicate the extradition process of the accused individual.  Extra-
dition agreements generally require that the conduct in question be 
criminal in both nations.  In a country with a weak or developing 
criminal code, the requisites for extradition and legal assistance may 
not be met if there are major inconsistencies between the penal codes 
in the corresponding countries.71 
To be able to prosecute a crime that occurred extraterritorially, 
States would be required to amend their penal code to accommodate 
a new category of crimes.  Countries may be hesitant to extend crim-
inal liability to all nationals who commit crimes abroad.  For exam-
ple, in American jurisprudence, there is a presumption against ex-
traterritoriality.72  Courts will look to see if Congress explicitly 
included an extraterritorial reach in the criminal statute before 
agreeing to convict or uphold a conviction based on a crime com-
mitted abroad.  Generally, when foreigners commit crimes in other 
                                                   
70  Odello, supra note 62, at part 6.  
71  Id.   
72  Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).  
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countries, they are left to the domestic criminal system.  This concern 
could be remedied by specific language limiting the extraterritorial 
scope to bureaucrats in international organizations, but this could 
conflict with some countries’ principle of equal treatment before the 
law.73  Many States have taken this step in relation to crimes com-
mitted by their nationals in a peacekeeping capacity.74  Depending 
on the wording, these statutes could also apply to nationals working 
as international civil servants outside of the peacekeeping context, 
or revisions could be made to expand their scope. 
The United Nations does repatriate dismissed nationals, who are 
accused of crimes, to States that have already enacted such laws.  In 
2015 the organization repatriated the four individuals dismissed for 
viewing and distributing child pornography, and the individual ac-
cused of trafficking drugs in a U.N. vehicle with the intention that 
the home States would investigate and prosecute them.75  The U.N. 
does not publicly disclose the nationalities of the disciplined em-
ployees, preventing external watchdog groups from following up 
with the home States and investigating the accountability mecha-
nisms used in those situations.  Based on statements made by Mem-
ber–States and non–governmental organizations, it appears that 
more often than not, States do not relay information about subse-
quent accountability measures based on U.N. referrals.76  
 
4.2.  Prosecution in the Host Country where the Alleged Crime 
Occurred 
 
In certain situations, the Secretary–General will waive immunity 
and cooperate with the investigation of the authorities in the host 
                                                   
73  Odello, supra note 62 at part 6. 
74  See, e.g., G.A, U.N. A/69/210 (2014).  Colombia reported that it had suffi-
cient extraterritorial provisions in its criminal code to facilitate the investigation 
and prosecution of a national who commits a crime abroad and who has not been 
charged by the local jurisdiction.  Colombia also noted that it has incorporated evi-
dentiary laws that will allow it to cooperate with U.N agencies in investigating and 
collecting evidence for the charges.  El Salvador made similar admissions. 
75  See Reuters Staff, supra note 47. 
76  GA/L/3485 Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials, Experts on 
Mission Critical to Organization’s Credibility, Legal Committee Stresses in Debate (Oct. 
22, 2014) http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gal3485.doc.htm; The Problem: Impu-
nity for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeeping Personnel, CODE BLUE 
CAMPAIGN (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.codebluecampaign.com/the-problem 
[https://perma.cc/FSX5-K26E]. 
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country.  As the main U.N. headquarters are located in the United 
States and Switzerland, the criminal charges will often arise in those 
jurisdictions.  Prosecution in either the United States or Switzerland 
probably will not raise concerns for the United Nations about due 
process, procedural fairness, or international standards of justice, as 
compared to other jurisdictions, due to the size, reputation, and sta-
bility of their legal systems.  The Secretary–General has, on many 
occasions, taken disciplinary action against an employee, decided 
against repatriation of the individual, and cooperated with the local 
criminal investigation.  One high profile example occurred in 2005, 
when investigators and prosecutors in the Southern District of New 
York charged two U.N. employees with conspiracy to launder 
money for their involvement in the Iraqi oil–for–food scandal.77  It 
remains unclear what criteria the Secretary–General considers in 
making his decision to support local efforts to investigate and pros-
ecute instead of repatriating a dismissed employee for criminal pro-
ceedings. 
There are several benefits to investigating and prosecuting 
where the crime occurred.  First, it allays concerns that the interna-
tional bureaucrats create a separate class of people who are above 
the local laws.78  Subjecting them to the local legal system, when it 
does not harm the interests of the organization, allows the host State 
to maintain a consistent standard for criminal behavior.  Especially 
for certain crimes, those that have local victims, engaging in the legal 
system of the affected community can be better in terms of restora-
tive justice.  This type of justice is not meant to punish the wrong-
doer, but rather to restore the dignity of the affected community.  
Effective restorative justice requires a proximity or bond between 
the community and the adjudicating body.79  A local procedure may 
restore trust in the legal system and allow victims of crimes to see 
that reporting crimes of international actors results in some form of 
                                                   
77  United States v. Kuznetsov, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 50653 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Stolen 
Asset Recovery Initiative, THE WORLD BANK, UNODC (Nov. 17, 2016), 
http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/18455 
[https://perma.cc/J29W-KLH2].  
78  Wolfgang Munch, Wrongdoing of International Civil Servants—Referral of 
Cases to National Authorities for Criminal Prosecution, 10 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 71, 
79 (2006); People v. Coumatos, supra note 21, at 1089 (expressing concern that granting 
widespread immunity from local jurisdiction would create “a large preferred class 
of people within our borders who would be immune to punishment” and would 
be “contrary to our sense of justice.”)  
79  William Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law Enforce-
ment: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729 (2003).  
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accountability.  When the victims are more removed from the justice 
system, it may be difficult for them to assess whether reporting the 
crime is worth the perceived risk.80 
Granting local government authority to act may expedite and 
improve the efficiency of the process.  When the evidence, witnesses, 
victims, and perpetrator are concentrated in one country, that State’s 
authorities are better situated to efficiently proceed.  They will not 
need to take the time or resources to relocate victims or witnesses, 
ship evidence while maintaining proper evidentiary procedures, or 
compensate as much for the language and culture barrier.81  The two 
jurisdictions with the highest number of U.N. personnel, Switzer-
land and the United States, have highly respected judicial systems 
that are well equipped to handle, in an effective manner, most, if not 
all, crimes that would arise.  Integrating these cases into competent 
local jurisdictions could prove cost effective for the United Nations, 
and due to the limited number of cases, would probably not be an 
overwhelming financial burden on the domestic legal systems. 
Advocates for prosecution in the host country assert that this is 
the accountability measure that is the most respectful of State sover-
eignty: a principle that is fundamental to the United Nations, and 
that can only be infringed upon in very particular, exigent circum-
stances.82  If a host State has a dysfunctional legal system, they argue 
that it should enter into an agreement with the U.N. to ensure a 
criminal procedure that respects the rights of the accused.83  This 
voluntary reassignment of prosecutorial responsibility maintains 
the State’s sovereignty interests, while safeguarding uniform ac-
countability. 
 
 
 
                                                   
80  A Practical Plan to End Impunity for Peacekeeper Sexual Abuse, CODE BLUE 
CAMPAIGN (October 13, 2016), http://www.codebluecampaign.com/press-re-
leases/2016/10/13 [https://perma.cc/7ZTM-GKWG]. 
81  Kelly Askin, Global: Ending Impunity for Crimes Committed by UN Peacekeep-
ers, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION (Jun. 17, 2016) http://www.ibanet.org/Arti-
cle/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=cebc5f69-a238-49bb-b85a-5e8d878fe485 
[https://perma.cc/25U9-JJD3]. 
82  Odello, supra note 62 at part 6(B). 
83  Id. (discussing the Global Legal Experts’ opinions in UN Doc A/59/710 
para. 18). 
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4.3.  Investigation and Prosecution by an Independent UN Tribunal 
 
The United Nations has expressed hesitancy, and even an un-
willingness, to take on a judicial or prosecutorial role towards its 
employees.84  OIOS, the branch responsible for the investigations 
into the most serious forms of employee misconduct, can only make 
a recommendation to the Office of Legal Affairs for the case to be 
referred to a national government for further action.85  The U.N. 
even denies itself the ability to fill the jurisdictional gap that occurs 
when the host State is unable to prosecute and the home State lacks 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, admitting that these kinds of gaps 
would allow a perpetrator to escape accountability.86  “[T]he Secre-
tariat cannot hold a person criminally accountable.  The Secretariat 
cannot conduct a criminal investigation [. . .] Nor can the Secretariat 
prosecute an alleged offender. In the absence of an executive man-
date where the United Nations is mandated to have law enforce-
ment and prosecutorial powers, such as in Kosovo [. . .] and Timor-
Leste [. . .] the exercise of criminal jurisdiction remains the responsi-
bility of Member States.”87  This language recognizes the U.N.’s cur-
rent inability to exercise criminal authority over these individuals. 
However, it also acknowledges the fact that the U.N. has the capac-
ity to engage in these judicial procedures when it has the authoriza-
tion to do so.  If enough political will existed, an independent U.N. 
tribunal specializing in criminal prosecution of international civil 
servants could be established, but the political capital would have to 
be quite substantial. 
The U.N. could establish both civilian and military tribunals 
staffed by professional judges and prosecutors.88  In the peacekeep-
ing context, legal professionals who share the nationality of the 
troops in question could staff the court.89  Having its nationals run-
ning the court, and not just standing before it, may engender more 
support from the troop-contributing countries.  These tribunals 
would be local, facilitating access to the evidence and the victim.  
The U.N. would also be able to ensure that the judges had proper 
                                                   
84  G.A. U.N. A/62/329 (2007) para. 16. 
85  Shockley, supra note 29 at 482. 
86  G.A. U.N. A/62/329 (2007) paras. 17–19. 
87  G.A. U.N. A/62/329 (2007) para. 16. 
88  Askin, supra note 81. 
89  Id.  
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training on sensitive issues such as gender violence and sex crimes.90  
To establish a cohesive and consistent independent legal system, the 
U.N. would have to determine what law it would apply; the Staff 
Rules and Regulations that currently govern employee conduct is 
not a criminal code and would not be applicable.  Efforts would 
need to be taken to create a code that comports with international 
standards of justice and many of the international human rights 
treaty obligations. 
Another alternative option could be a hybrid tribunal that would 
be a joint venture between the United Nations and the host State.  
This cooperation would allow for a local prosecution that utilizes 
the expertise of the international community and comports with in-
ternational standards of due process and justice.91  The U.N. has en-
gaged in several hybrid tribunals in the past, including the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambo-
dia.92  The U.N.’s ability to establish such a tribunal would depend 
on the consent of the host State, acquiescence of the Security Coun-
cil, and funding from other Member-States.93  As these hybrid tribu-
nals have proved to be very expensive to establish in the past, the 
Member-States would have to determine whether the benefits from 
a hybrid structure would outweigh the financial burden of creating 
it.  This option would most likely only be feasible in a developing 
nation that experiences widespread misconduct from international 
civil servants in its jurisdiction. 
A third tribunal possibility would be one that is completely in-
dependent from the United Nations.  The Code Blue Campaign, a 
non-governmental organization (NGO) advocating for greater ac-
countability for peacekeepers, advocates for an international legal 
entity that specializes in certain types of criminal cases, funded di-
rectly by Member-States.94  The tribunal would be located in the 
country where the crime took place and would employ impartial 
                                                   
90  Id.   
91  Odello, supra n. 62 at part 6(c). 
92  Id.  
93  See e.g. S/Res/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (Requesting that the U.N. negotiate with 
Sierra Leone to create a special court.).  Sierra Leone later consented to the Court in 
an agreement with the U.N, and the court was born.  
94  A Practical Plan to End Impunity for Peacekeeper Sexual Abuse, supra note 80 at 
2-3 (Code Blue Campaign introduces a solution to the problems that exist within 
the UN system for civilians). 
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members of the international and national police and judicial com-
munities.95  These tribunals would receive the referrals and cooper-
ate where possible with the home States.96  The NGO argues that this 
system would remedy two major faults in the current system: it 
would avoid the conflict of interest that exists when the U.N. polices 
itself, and it would introduce a consistent standard of accountability 
that would restore the reputation of the United Nations as a bastion 
for human rights.97  While this NGO’s mission is specifically tar-
geted at establishing reliable accountability measures for peace-
keepers, the critiques and arguments it makes could easily be ap-
plied to the broader international civil servant community. 
 
4.4.  International Criminal Court Jurisdiction Over International 
Civil Servants 
 
The United Nations was instrumental in the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Secretary-General and 
the General Assembly have encouraged States to ratify the Rome 
Statute and participate in the process.98  This would seem to recom-
mend cooperation between the organization and the Court.  If a sit-
uation arose in which a U.N. employee was accused of a crime that 
fell within the ICC mandate, immunity should not apply to shield 
him or her from the jurisdiction of the Court, as the actions should 
not be connected to the individual’s official functions.99  If the Secre-
tary-General determines that immunity does apply in that circum-
stance, he should waive it. Some scholars suggest that a waiver of 
immunity is not necessary because Article 27 of the Rome Statute 
dictates that the Statute should “apply equally to all persons without 
any distinction based on official capacity. . . Immunities or special 
procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a per-
son, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the 
                                                   
95  Id. at 3. 
96  Id. 
97  Id.   
98  Paul C. Szasz and Thordis Ingadottir, The UN and the ICC: The Immunity of 
the UN and Its Officials, 14 LJIL 867, 875 (2001) (comments on the fact that these in-
stitutions were established under the auspices of the Rome Statute).  
99  Id. at 880–881 (crimes committed by UN employees should not relate to their 
function.).   
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Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.”100  As the 
United Nations is not a party to the Rome Statute, it is unclear that 
it would be obligated to waive immunity of its employees to comply 
with this provision.  However, arguments can be made as to the nor-
mative merits of such a waiver. 
Despite the serious nature of some of the crimes committed by 
U.N. employees, the majority of the criminal infractions lay far out-
side the current purview of the International Criminal Court as de-
fined in the Rome Statute.  Even some of the most egregious crimes 
committed by U.N. employees in conflict zones lack the requirement 
of being “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack.”101  
There are exceptional cases that would seem to fall within the juris-
diction of the Court.  In 1994 during the Rwandan genocide, a U.N. 
employee hired to protect other U.N. workers was accused of par-
ticipating in the murders of thirty-two people, including several of 
his colleagues.102  He was accused of personally shooting two peo-
ple. Twenty-four witnesses corroborated these allegations, yet he 
never faced prosecution.103  In fact, he went on to hold several more 
U.N. posts around the world.104 
Even if the alleged crime fell under the mandate of the ICC, or 
the prosecutors were able to re-interpret some of the subject matter 
restrictions in the Rome Statute, there is strong State opposition to 
the prosecution of their nationals in the ICC.  While this has mostly 
been discussed in the peacekeeping context and more specifically in 
relation to the military contingents, it seems unlikely that these 
States would drastically change their position for their non-military 
nationals.  In 2002, the Security Council, led by the United States, 
unanimously passed resolution 1422, exempting peacekeeping 
troops from countries not party to Rome Statute from ICC jurisdic-
tion.105  While the Security Council refused to renew the resolution 
                                                   
100  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 27(1–2) (Jul. 19, 1998); 
Szasz and Ingadottir, supra note 98 at 881.  
101  Rome Statute, supra note 100, at art 7; Odello, supra note 62 at 370–373 (the 
crimes of UN employees are not being policed by the body itself and are not seen 
as UN issues of adjudication).   
102  Jane Perlez, Rwandan Accused in Genocide Wins Suit for U.N. Pay, NEW YORK 
TIMES, (Aug. 8, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/08/world/rwandan-ac-
cused-in-genocide-wins-suit-for-un-pay.html?_r=2 (showing what the UN em-
ployee was accused of, and the effect of the accusation.).   
103  Id. (news article shows that UN employee was never prosecuted).  
104  Id. (specifically showing that the UN employee kept his job).  
105  S/Res/1422 (July 12, 2002).  
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in 2004, it still marks a strong intent of one of the permanent five 
members to keep its citizens outside of the reach of the ICC. 
 
5.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The current accountability system for international civil servants 
is riddled with inconsistencies: for the same act U.N. employees are 
locally prosecuted, repatriated for criminal proceedings, or simply 
fired without being criminally investigated.106  Erratic practice and 
ex-post decision making about proper accountability avenues have 
led to jurisdictional gaps that hinder clear accountability.  Given the 
framework and practice discussed in the earlier sections of this pa-
per, the author would like to recommend enhanced transparency 
and consistency through a published policy that determines the 
prosecutorial responsibility ex-ante, and the dissemination of more 
detailed information about alleged crimes and the responsible juris-
diction. 
The Secretary-General should promulgate an official policy that 
outlines, and states the rationale behind, specific situations in which 
his office will repatriate employees or cooperate with local prosecu-
tion efforts, or refer to a separate tribunal.  The scenarios listed do 
not need to be exhaustive, but should illustrate the proffered ra-
tionale, allowing for a predictable and consistent practice to de-
velop.  Articulating a reasoned plan ex-ante would close some of the 
jurisdictional gaps identified in this paper by clearly delegating re-
sponsibility for the individual. 
It is not necessary, and may not be the best practice, for the 
United Nations to choose one accountability avenue over another 
one for all cases.  There may be certain instances of misconduct that 
are most efficiently dealt with in local courts, and others that are best 
resolved in an independent tribunal or in the individual’s home 
country.  A full analysis of possible scenarios and a detailed plan for 
consistent accountability are outside the scope of this paper; how-
ever an example of a policy could be the following: Employees 
working at headquarters who commit crimes in those jurisdictions 
                                                   
106  Compare the individual dismissed in 2008-2009 for viewing and distrib-
uting child pornography who was prosecuted locally with the individuals termi-
nated for the same act in 2014-2015 who were repatriated for criminal investigation. 
ST/IC/2009/30; ST/IC/2015/22.  
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will be referred for local prosecution, while those working at peace-
keeping missions will be repatriated or tried in a local hybrid tribu-
nal if one is especially designed for the mission.  Preferencing local 
investigation and prosecution over repatriation may help maintain 
the necessary independence of the international bureaucracy by re-
moving an employee’s incentive to benefit his or her nation of origin 
in hopes of preferential treatment upon repatriation. 
Another important transparency measure that the Secretary-
General should implement is to release specific details about all 
criminal referrals, including the nature of the crime and the country 
responsible for further investigation.  This information could easily 
be included in the annual circulars, or the office could publish a sep-
arate report.  Making this kind of information publicly available 
would allow civil society and interested parties to act as a watch dog 
and pressure Member-States to follow through on their investiga-
tory obligations.  Given that OIOS is not a body with prosecutorial 
authority, and that its decisions in disciplinary matters do not re-
quire as high of a burden of proof as traditional criminal proceed-
ings, the Secretary-General may have an interest in keeping the 
identity of the dismissed employee private to protect the individ-
ual’s due process rights.  Ultimately the name of the alleged criminal 
is not imperative for better accountability. 
The United Nations occupies a position of high moral standing, 
from which it monitors, reviews, and recommends instrumental 
changes for Member-States.  This position has been tarnished by the 
reports of criminal acts committed by the organization’s employees.  
While it is unreasonable to expect that all of the U.N.’s 44,000 
employees exemplify perfect behavior, it is reasonable for the 
international community to demand that the U.N. institute a 
consistent and transparent accountability system to ensure proper 
criminal investigations and prosecutions take place after the 
individual leaves the organization.  Given the current piecemeal 
framework, the author posits that this goal could be achieved 
through publishing a detailed policy that allocates responsibility for 
criminal action ex-ante, and by disclosing further details about 
specific crimes that would allow the press and civil society to follow-
up on the cases and motivate States to fulfil their responsibilities. 
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